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FOREWORD
The present paper dealing with Indicators of the Relative Importance of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to Developing Countries is one contribution of the joint UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development to the ongoing debate on the impact and relevance of intellectual property to development. By categorizing countries according to different schema, based on technological activity, industrial performance and technology imports, the study concludes that countries will face different outcomes from strengthening IPRs (in particular patents), not just at different levels of development, but even at similar levels of income, depending on their pattern of technology development and imports. While there is no clear case that most developing countries below the newly industrializing economy stage will gain in net terms from TRIPS, the least-developed countries (LDCs) are most likely to lose. The gains that might accrue through increased technological inflows are likely to be realized over the long term, while the costs for the domestic industry (in terms of increased difficulties to copy or reverse engineer foreign technology) will accrue immediately. The paper stresses, however, that more evidence is needed before a positive link between foreign direct investment and the licensing of technology to domestic firms on the one side and IPRs on the other side can definitely be established.
In sum, without seeking to determine the amount of the costs or benefits, or identifying individual countries that will gain or lose from TRIPS, this study illustrates the wide differences between developing countries with respect to the impact of strengthened IPRs.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have never been more economically and politically important or controversial than they are today. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, integrated circuits and geographical indications are frequently mentioned in discussions and debates on such diverse topics as public health, food security, education, trade, industrial policy, traditional knowledge, biodiversity, biotechnology, the Internet, the entertainment and media industries. In a knowledge-based economy, there is no doubt that an understanding of IPRs is indispensable to informed policy making in all areas of human development.
Intellectual Property was until recently the domain of specialists and producers of intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement concluded during the Uruguay Round negotiations has signalled a major shift in this regard. The incorporation of intellectual property rights into the multilateral trading system and its relationship with a wide area of key public policy issues has elicited great concern over its pervasive role in people's lives and in society in general. Developing country members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) no longer have the policy options and flexibilities developed countries had in using IPRs to support their national development. But, TRIPS is not the end of the story. Significant new developments vi are taking place at the international, regional and bilateral level that build on and strengthen the minimum TRIPS standards through the progressive harmonisation of policies along standards of technologically advanced countries. The challenges ahead in designing and implementing IP-policy at the national and international levels are considerable.
Empirical evidence on the role of IP protection in promoting innovation and growth in general remains limited and inconclusive. Conflicting views also persist on the impacts of IPRs in the development prospects. Some point out that, in a modern economy, the minimum standards laid down in TRIPS, will bring benefits to developing countries by creating the incentive structure necessary for knowledge generation and diffusion, technology transfer and private investment flows. Others stress that intellectual property, especially some of its elements, such as the patenting regime, will adversely affect the pursuit of sustainable development strategies by raising the prices of essential drugs to levels that are too high for the poor to afford; limiting the availability of educational materials for developing country school and university students; legitimising the piracy of traditional knowledge; and undermining the self-reliance of resource-poor farmers.
It is urgent, therefore, to ask the question: How can developing countries use IP tools to advance their development strategy? What are the key concerns surrounding the issues of IPR for developing countries? What are the specific difficulties they face in intellectual property negotiations? Is intellectual property directly relevant to sustainable development and to the achievement of agreed international development goals? Do they have the capacity, especially the least developed among them, to formulate their negotiating positions and become well-informed negotiating partners? These are essential questions that policy makers need to address in order to design IPR laws and policies that best meet the needs of their people and negotiate effectively in future agreements.
It is to address some of these questions that the joint UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development was launched in July 2001. One central objective has been to facilitate the emergence of a critical mass of well-informed stakeholders in developing countries -including decision makers, negotiators but also the private sector and civil society -who will be able to define their own sustainable human development objectives in the field of IPRs and effectively advance them at the national and international levels.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A fair amount of uncertainty remains on the economic impact of the TRIPs Agreement in developing countries, and the new round of WTO negotiations adds considerable interest to this controversy. It is widely accepted that the effects of TRIPs on industry and technology will vary according to countries' levels of economic development. The need for, and benefits of, stronger patent protection seem to rise with incomes and technological sophistication.
In theory, society reaps four kinds of benefits from granting temporary monopoly rights to innovators through patents. These are: (i) the stimulation of private innovation; (ii) the use of the new knowledge in productive activity; (iii) the dissemination of new knowledge; and (iv) the stimulation of innovation by other enterprises. But the importance of patents fluctuates considerably according to two variables: the technological nature of the activity, and the nature of the economy.
Taking the first of these variables, the role of patents in stimulating research and development (R&D) depends on the activity. In industries where it is relatively easy to copy new products -fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the best examples -patents are vital for sustaining the large and risky R&D expenditures needed for product innovation. In industries where copying is very difficult and expensive (these industries account for the bulk of manufacturing in most countries), patents per se are not important for appropriating the benefits from innovation.
Turning to the second, the significance of patents varies by the level of development. The main beneficiaries of TRIPs are the advanced countries. There are few benefits in terms of stimulating local innovation in developing countries. Technological activity in the latter consists mainly of learning to use imported technologies efficiently rather than to innovate on the technological frontier. Weak patents can help local firms in early stages to build technological capabilities by permitting imitation and reverse engineering. This is certainly borne out by the experience of the Asian 'tigers', such as like Korea and Taiwan that developed strong indigenous firms in an array of sophisticated industries.
The available historical and cross-section evidence supports the presumption that the need for patents varies with the level of development. Many rich countries used weak patent protection in their early stages of industrialisation, increasing protection as they approached the leaders. Econometric cross-section evidence suggests an inverted-U shaped relationship between the strength of patents and income levels. The intensity of patenting first falls with rising incomes, as countries slacken patents to build local capabilities by copying, then rises as they engage in more innovative effort. The turning point is $7,750 per capita in 1985 prices, a fairly high-income level for the developing world.
In short, assessing the impact of TRIPs in the developing world requires one to distinguish between levels of development. There is no clear case that most developing countries below the newly industrialising economy stage will gain in net terms from TRIPs; the leastdeveloped ones are most likely to lose. The gains that might accrue through increased technological inflows are likely to be realised over the long term, while the costs will accrue
immediately. In present value terms, therefore, one can expect a significant net loss.
Indisputably, a differentiated approach to intellectual property rights is called for.
Classification of Countries by IPR Relevance
For the ICTSD-UNCTAD capacity-building project on intellectual property rights, we sought to 4. The fourth level comprises countries with no significant technological activity. Thesethe least-industrialised countries with the simplest technological structures -are likely to gain least, and lose most, from strict patent rules. They will tend to pay the costs (higher prices for protected products and technologies) but gain little by way of technology development or transfer. We considered technological effort at the national level based on the data we generated for productive enterprise R&D and international patents. The 87 countries were surveyed could be subdivided as follows: 22 industrialised economies, seven economies in transition, and 58 developing economies. The data revealed the existence of four groups of countries as follows: 
Industrial Performance
As expected, there generally is a strong relationship between the technology and industrial performance indices. Technological effort is intimately related to levels of industrialisation, success in export activity, and the sophistication of the production and export structures.
There is clearly a positive correlation between patents, industrial performance and technological effort. This does not mean, however, that patents are causally related to growth and development: each rises with development levels. Moreover, there is probably a strong non-linearity involved. Strong patents are probably beneficial beyond a certain level of industrial sophistication, while below this level their benefits for development are unclear.
In addition, the further down one goes in the scale the less evident the benefits become. In terms of the performance index, the 'very low' and 'low' performance groups are, on average, unlikely to benefit from TRIPs. In both 'medium' groups there is probably a mixture of beneficial and non-beneficial effects depending on the country, with a case for strengthening IPRs in the medium term. In the 'high' performance group the benefits are clearer. There is one important factor here that may have a bearing on IPRs: the growth of 'international production systems'. While trans-national corporations (TNCs) have had export platforms in developing countries, the emerging trend has been for them to locate (tightly linked) processes in different countries to serve global or regional markets.
This trend is particularly marked in high-tech activities, led by electronics. The emergence of international production systems has enabled countries to move up the production, export and technological complexity ladder rapidly without first building a domestic technology base. Again, the East Asian economies bear this out. With the exception of Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore, none has a strong domestic technology base in electronics. The electronics production system, however, only encompasses a limited number of developing countries.
Does the promise of integrated systems mean that developing countries should adopt stronger
IPRs in the hope of attracting export-oriented TNCs?
The short-term answer is probably 'no'. Most TNC assembly activity has been attracted to developing countries without changing the national patent regime by isolating exportprocessing zones from the rest of the economy. China is a good example. For the longer term, however, the answer is likely to be 'yes' -at least for those countries seeking to attract hightech production systems. Inducing TNCs to invest in such activities when competitors are offering stronger IPRs would force all aspirants to also have equally strong protection.
Moreover, countries that already have high-tech assembly operations would need to strengthen IPRs to induce TNCs to deepen their operations into more advanced technologies and functions like R&D and design. At the highest end of TNC activity, where developing countries compete directly with advanced industrial countries, the IPR regime would have to match the strongest one in the developed world.
However, as integrated systems are highly concentrated geographically, these considerations may not apply to many developing countries. Countries far from centres of activity, and with low technological capabilities, may continue to be marginalized from most TNC activities.
The strengthening of IPRs may actually reinforce the tendency to concentrate high-value functions in a few efficient, well-located sites, implying that these other countries would, as a result of TRIPs, have fewer tools to build local capabilities in the future.
Technology Imports
The lack of correlation between technology effort and technology imports is not surprising.
There is no a priori reason to expect that countries that do more R&D would also receive larger amounts of FDI relative to their economic size or spend more on foreign technology than other countries. In some cases, there is good reason to expect the opposite -a strong technology base may lead to more outward rather than inward FDI relative to GNP and to greater royalty receipts than payments. In other cases, strong FDI inflows and royalty payments may go with a weak local technology base.
This reinforces the conclusion that countries will face different outcomes from strengthening IPRs, not just at different levels of development but even at similar levels of income, depending on their pattern of technology development and imports. It may, of course, be argued that all countries should in the future be more receptive to FDI and licensing and that stronger IPRs will promote both. In fact, countries with exceptionally low levels of technology inflows should make special efforts to raise them. More evidence is needed, however, before we can say with certainty that FDI and licensing respond positively to intellectual property rights.
When we consider technology imports in the form of capital goods, we find that the pattern is very similar to other forms of technology imports: group averages change in line with the technology index, but with large variations between individual countries. Much of the variation has to do with the size of the economy (apart, obviously, from the level of development), with larger countries less dependent on imported equipment than smaller ones.
Food for Thought
This review illustrates the significant differences both between rich and poor countries and within the developing world itself in the variables that may affect the technological impact of Since the creation and diffusion of new knowledge are desirable for growth, it is necessary to trade off static optimisation in favour of dynamic considerations. The optimum solution would be for the governments of innovating countries to subsidise innovators until the costs of the subsidies equalled the benefits to society, and to then allow the dissemination of knowledge at marginal cost (Maskus, 2000, p. 30) . It would be very difficult in practice to calculate the optimal research subsidy, and a practical second-best solution is to grant a temporary monopoly that enables innovators to reap 'rents' (profits in excess of normal competitive profits).
It is admitted by analysts that this does not yield a perfect solution to the underlying market failure, but it is a workable compromise that has worked well in the past, at least in the industrial countries that are the source of the overwhelming bulk of innovation.
In theory, society reaps four kinds of benefits from granting temporary monopoly rights to innovators. Each is subject to qualifications as far as developing countries are concerned, taken up later. not important to protect innovation) take out patents (Cantwell and Andersen, 1996) . 
Nature of the economy
More relevant to the present discussion is that the significance of IPRs varies by the level of development. Theory also suggests that the benefits of IPRs rise with income and that at very low levels the costs of strengthening IPRs may well outweigh the gains. Maskus (2000) notes three potential costs.
1.
Higher prices for imported products and new technologies under IPR protection.
2.
Loss of economic activity, by the closure of imitative activities
3.
The possible abuse of protection by patent holders, especially large foreign companies.
Maskus goes on to argue, however, that these costs are more than offset by the longer-term benefits of IPRs, even in developing countries. These benefits are as follows (with qualifications noted): Note also that the TNC response to IPRs is likely to be function specific. Survey evidence suggests that highlevel R&D is more likely to be affected by the IPR regime than basic production or marketing (Mansfield, 1994 (Cantwell and Andersen, 1996) . Second, the data are readily available and can be taken to an extremely detailed level. We follow this convention, using US patents as an indicator of commercially valuable innovation.
4.
The 
1.
The world technological leaders, with intense technological activity and considerable innovative capabilities as shown by international patenting.
They are likely to benefit from (and most already have) strong IPRs.
2.
Countries with moderate technological activity.
These countries conduct some R&D, have medium levels of industrial development and are likely on balance to benefit from stronger IPRs. However, some countries in this group may bear significant adjustment costs in changing IPR regimes. Note: R&D is only that financed by productive enterprises. Patents are those taken out in the US. Total R&D and patents are average for each country.
Let us now consider technological effort at the national level. Table 2 gives the data for productive enterprise R&D and international patents for 87 countries (those with significant industrial activity on which the necessary data are available). They come from the following groups: These are technological newcomers, and have followed different strategies to build up their capabilities (Lall, 1996 (Lall, 1996) . It may also be the case that the political economy that allowed such strong industrial policy to work was difficult to replicate in other countries. it is difficult to discern the net outcome.
Group 4
This group has no meaningful technological activity by 
Competitive Industrial Performance
We now use 'competitive industrial performance' to rank countries and then combine the technology index There is little need to discuss the groups in detail, as the patterns are fairly self-evident. This may imply that these other countries would, as a result of TRIPS, have fewer tools to build local capabilities in the future.
Let us now combine the technology and industrial performance indices to derive a combined index, an indicator of overall 'domestic capabilities'. Table 5 shows the three indices, with countries ranked by the combined capability index. The picture that emerges is entirely plausible.
Countries are now divided into five groups. The implications are very similar to those drawn earlier and need not be repeated. Table 7 gives the values of the individual countries ranked by the technology effort index.
Capital goods imports are shown separately below. The three forms of technology imports can be combined into a composite technology import index (Table 9 ).
This index has some correlation with the domestic capability index (coefficient of 0.56), but there are many individual differences in ranking for reasons noted above. For instance, India ranks low in the technology import index but does better on the domestic capability index.
The countries in Table 9 are ranked according to the technology import index, and divided into four groups. 2 Since the focus here is on technological considerations in the classification, the aspect of IPRs it refers most directly to is patents. Copyrights and trademarks raise different sets of issues, and the case for strengthening them across the board is probably clearer than for patents. While some technological issues can also arise for copyrights (say, in software), and a case can be made for lax IPRs to promote local learning and dissemination, this is not considered separately here.
3 For such analysis, see references in Maskus (2000) , Gould and Gruben (1996) and World Bank (2001) . 4 See, for instance, Braga et al. (1999) and Maskus (2000) . 5 Developing countries can undertake considerable technological activity to master, adapt and improve upon imported technologies. Indeed, as Lall (2001) notes, differences in such capability building are the main factor differentiating between success and failure in industrial development. However, this kind of technological activity does not lead to patentable innovation and so does not need strong IPRs; indeed, as noted later, lax IPRs may be beneficial because they permit a major form of learning: imitation and reverse engineering. 6 Note that this is a purely economic argument based on the social gains from innovation. It does not take into account the (non-economic) argument that it is 'fair' or 'just' to reward innovators, and that all users of innovations should share equally in providing these rewards. On these grounds, those who avoid their share are 'free riding' and should be penalised. This kind of moral argument is often explicitly or implicitly used in the debate on IPRs.
However, it can be argued just as plausibly that poor consumers of innovations should pay less than rich ones on moral, distributional or humanitarian grounds. The issue then becomes whether aid, redistribution or charity should be given in this form -of lax IPRs that allow for lower prices -than in the form of direct financial flows between governments. Again, a good case can be made for innovative products consumed by large sections of poor populations (medicines, for example) that the impact via product prices is far greater and more effective than via aid channelled through the government. See UNDP (2001) for a discussion of some of the issues concerning the pharmaceutical industry and human development.
7 Chang (2001) , Rasiah (2001) . 8 The main recourse countries have is compulsory licensing, but the use of this instrument is constrained in many poor countries by other factors like economic pressures brought by the home countries of innovators.
9 See Braga et al. (1999) , Luthria (1999) , Chang (2001) and Rasiah (2001) . 10 The R&D data are in current US dollars. We prefer R&D financed by productive enterprises to total R&D because the latter includes expenditures on defence, agriculture and so on that are not directly relevant to innovation by private agents. However, both measures (in dollar terms) yield very similar national rankings, and the results would not change significantly if we used total R&D figures.
11 Patents taken out internationally include those filed by affiliates of TNCs operating in the country. This does not matter for present purposes since local R&D by TNCs reflects the innovative capacity of the host country. 13 However, the ranks according to R&D and international patenting are very similar overall, with a the correlation coefficient of over 0.9.
14 The data are drawn from OECD (1999) and various national sources.
15 Licensing payments are taken from published national balance of payments statistics (from the IMF and national sources), and cover all types of royalty and technical fees paid abroad, as well as payments for trademarks and possibly consultancy services. Some countries do not break down their invisible payments overseas in detail; for these we estimated the figures based on proportions of service payments accounted for by licensing payments in other countries at similar levels of development and with similar trade and FDI policies.
